B.A.M. Development, LLC., v. Salt Lake County : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2007
B.A.M. Development, LLC., v. Salt Lake County :
Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Stephen G. Homer; Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant.
Lohra L. Miller; Donald H. Hansen; Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, B.A.M. Development v. Salt Lake County, No. 20070137 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/92
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., a 




SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body 
politic and a political 
subdivision of the State 
of Utah, 
Defendant-Appellee 
[ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED] 
[Argument Priority 15] 
Appellate Case No. 20070137CA 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
The Honorable Timothy R Hanson, District Judge 
STEPHEN G HOMER 
Attorney at Law 
2877 West 9150 South 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C. 
DONALD H HANSEN 
Deputy Salt Lake County District Attorney 
S-3700 Salt Lake County Government Center 
2001 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellee 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
AUG 3 1 2007 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED DECISION REQUESTED 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JVELOPMKN. 
a Utah limited i iaoi 1 ; i v 
company, 





-• 7 LAKE COUNTY, a Utiiii x 
body politic and politica 
subdivision of the State i 
of Utah ' '•• ocket . 20070137-CA 
Defendant ' 'ii^ii^" 15] 
The Plaintiff-Appellant "!•:.• : -"y- ^.^ 
S .i • • • rollowinq ^ its APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF. 
XAb. 
T-Ri.i-' JC CONTENTS 1 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 1 
REPLY AP^TTMENT 3 
CONv...w. , 23 
C E R T I F I C A T E T- DELIVER 24 
' A U T H G I V J - J - ^ ^ S 
Banberry Development Corporation vr qr-..,, ,. ..,.aa:. 
City . I .:•'. •••- > •; A: ] ''•'" 
l i i c i — .1 •—IK. _ - ••»»\ A S S O C X a t 6 ' 
"~
,c
--? :' 2 d 8 9 2 U t a h S u p r e m e O i a i t 1 9 8 Q ^ 9 
o. . . S L l t y U i i->i c o i_ u v / i j j l i , U t c i l ' i , ' . . 2 c i . I ' 7 
'>-.'-• 1 9 7 9 ) , on r e h e a r i n g 614 P . 2 n 1259 i l J t a h 
i 
1980) , 16 
Colman vs State Land Board, 
795 P.2d 622 (Utah Supreme Court 1990) . . . . 14 
Dolan vs City of Tigard, 
512 US 374, 114 SCt 2309 (USSCt 1994) . . . 7, 23 
Holmstrom vs C R England, Inc., 
2000 UT App 239, 8 P.3d 281 
(Utah Court of Appeals 2000) 8 
Howell vs Howell, 
806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App 1993) 4 
Jacobsen Investment Company vs State Tax 
Commission, 839 P.2d 789 (Utah 1992) 3 
Malan vs Lewis, 
693 P.2d 661 (Utah Supreme Court 1984) . . . . 20 
Nollan vs California Coastal Commission, 
483 US 825, 107 SCt 3141 (USSCt 1987) . 5, 6, 23 
Olson vs Park-Craig-Olson, Inc, 
815 P.2d 1356 (Utah Court of Appeals 1991) . . . 9 
Provo River Water Users' Association vs Morgan, 
857 P.2d 927 (Utah 1993) 4 
Salt Lake County vs Calston, 
776 P.d 653 (Utah Court of Appeals 1989) . . . . 9 
Sanders vs Ovard, 
838 P.2d 1134 (Utah 1992) 3 
Society of Separationists, Inc. vs Taggart, 
862 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1993) 3 
State Tax Commission vs Department of Finance, 
576 P.2d 1297 (Utah Supreme Court 1978) . . 20, 21 
State vs Deli, 
861 P.2d 431 (Utah 1993 4 
State vs Pena, 




THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO CORRECTLY APPLY 
THE NOLLAN-DOLAN STANDARD IS NOT AN "ISSUE OF FACT" 
ENTITLED TO DEFERENTIAL REVIEW ON APPEAL 
In its brief the COUNTY advances the novel but 
nevertheless legally-incorrect assertion that the District 
Court's analysis, rulings and conclusions regarding the 
"rough proportionality" issue which is essentially THE 
core issue in this case are an "issue of fact" entitled to 
a deferential standard of review. Such is absolutely 
incorrect. Although the "rough proportionality" question 
does require some "factual" issues (as do most litigated 
cases), the correct application thereof to the material 
facts is an "issue of law" and for which the Court of 
Appeals should review without any particular deference or 
presumption that the District Court "did it right". 
The trial court's conclusions of law in civil cases are 
reviewed for correctness. Society of Separationists, Inc. vs 
Taggart, 862 P.2d 1339, 1341 (Utah Supreme Court 1993) . This 
standard of review has also been referred to as a 
"correction of error standard". Jacobsen Investment Company 
vs State Tax Commission, 839 P.2d 789, 790 (Utah Supreme 
Court 1992); Sanders vs Ovard, 838 P.2d 1134, 1135 (Utah 
Supreme Court 1992). "Correction of error" means that no 
^ 
particular deference is given to the trial court's ruling on 
questions of law. State vs Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 936 (Utah 
Supreme Court 1994) ; Provo River Water Users' Association vs 
Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah Supreme Court 1993). The 
"correction of error" standard means that the appellate 
court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in 
any degree to the trial judge's determination of law. State 
vs Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah Supreme Court 1993) ; Howell 
vs Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Court of Appeals 1993) . 
II 
THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE COUNTY'S 
"HIGHWAY-ABUTTING" ORDINANCE AND ITS APPLICATION 
TO B.A.M. IS READILY APPARENT 
It does not take a "rocket scientist" to readily 
observe and conclude that the unconstitutionality of the 
COUNTY'S so-called "highway-abutting" Ordinance requiring, 
as a condition of issuance of governmental permission for 
development approval (ala subdivision development and/or 
building permit issuance) the uncompensated dedication of 
roadway AND the required installation of adjacent 
improvements is apparent: for "Takings Clause" reasons and 
for obvious "equal protection" reasons. [One need merely pay 
close attention to the COUNTY'S oft-repeated phrasing that 
the exactions (dedication and improvements installation) are 
required against "highway-abutting" property owners (such as 
B.A.M. ar , ". . iMt^d" arsons'' . Unstated, but 
nevertheless carefully concealed in t:ic '•. • " **" -" ut, 
is :.he s m i ^ - i-< ' • parcels wl-i :i create the same 
"impact" upon the roadway, are all exeiq- * ana ail 
"exaction ^ -^' Those "non-abutting" parcels are 
undei :\r '" ievelopment restrict ion" . 
/nu. ' ' " " "; : ••Jiiway-abuttinq" Ordinance, and 
the exactions derived thereunde. « :- fr0111 the 
uncoi... 3 " i^ ir.n " '^iif first identified in the 
Nollan case in 1^8 . .viierem in J :•*>•-•'• :oreme Court 
Wlote: 
We view the Fifth Amendment's property clause t^ 
be more than a pleading requirement, and 
compliance with it more than an exercise in 
cleverness and imagination. As indicated earlier, 
our cases describe the condition for abridgement 
of property rights through the police power as a 
"substantial advancing" of a legitimate State 
interest. We are inclined to be particularly 
careful about the objective where the actual 
conveyance of property is made a condition to the 
lifting of a land use restriction, since in that 
context there is a heightened risk that the 
purpose is avoidance of the compensation 
requirement, rather than the stated police power 
objective. 
107 SCt „: •'•nr-i-i:--.; ^  added. 
It ir:- patently obvious that the COUNTY " ; hi'il'iway-
abuttinq' :.. iJ: :•- i.-.n resents the "heightened risk" 
that its purpose is the "avoidance of ili< o nripensat Ion 
requirement' Indeed, wtinn coupled with the simple fact that 
q 
other "similarly-situated" parcels (in terms of roadway 
traffic "impact", not "highway-abutting" status) are not 
required to sustain any exaction, that conclusion i.e. 
"avoidance of the compensation requirement" is 
inescapable. The "avoidance of the compensation requirement 
(of the Just Compensation Clause)" does not "advance a 
legitimate governmental interest". 
The COUNTY'S failure to acknowledge and obey the 
constitutional requirement (clearly a matter of law since 
1987 after Nolan was announced) was evident all through the 
initial trial and even on appeal. For example, the COUNTY 
has stated 
The exaction in this case then, is not an "ad hoc" 
discretionary assessment imposed on an 
individualized basis at the whim of some 
bureaucrat, or based upon unique impact factors 
attributable exclusively to BAM's particular 
development. 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER AND CROSS-RESPONDENT SALT LAKE 
COUNTY ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI [2004] , page 6. Emphasis added. 
One need merely examine the trial court's "findings" 
and "conclusions", including the actual assertions, the 
nuances thereof, and the apparent logical progression 
reflecting the COUNTY'S thinking on the subject to 
ascertain what really happened in 1998. COUNTY Traffic 
Engineer Pullos, confronted with B.A.M.'s request for 
development approval, merely called up UDOT and Wasatch 
Front Regional •..-. u; i^ k-ril t:h-- simple question, in 
essence: "What :1- y.;.-;.: i hink t:ii*•- 1.oaaway widl:l") :;hould he?' 
What do you .; 
^Hhoi.icm P. A.!-' relieves T>oi.an a<~* .
 t. : . » 6 a 
"pre-ldKiiM -.- -. . ' ".dividualized determination" and 
although the COUNTY asserts otherwise uiaiik-ly, lh..i ,i "post-
Taking" ;- - ••* ;; is allowed), in this case the 
distinction is immateria1 ^ ^ ^he .;.;.] - \ -. ' 1 the 
determii i,*. • !-•:•!••.--n
 Liie COUNTY simply doesn't work, 
pre-taking o* post; - taking. 
COUNTY'S NEWLY-IDENTIFIED METHODOLOGY, 
ADVANCED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL, 
SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED 
Faced with ^ ^ nm-na; . mathematical 
;.:<•:-:•: > .'^Sdiica JL:. I- . • '•' pe: -II-J BRIEF the (••••;: '" 
seemingly abandons that po,^  ,----;;--- and now, -'or 
Y
 hf1' * time •' ippeal), seeks an alternative 
justification as t- •: . - • -^  : ui the mathematical 
1Such ;i simplistic approach is consistent with her 
testimony, as well as the documentary evidence produced before 
the original trial in the District Court. This issue, however/ 
is not herein raised to establish the COUNTY'S failure to 
effect Dolan's "burden of proof" requirements; rather, the 
identification of this issue is to point out the consistency 
of the COUNTY'S "findings" as reflecting the actual 
presentation of the evidence to the District Court. That same 
procedural, approach is arguably following in the COUNTY'S 
recitation of the historical facts, as contained in its BRIEF. 
n 
derivation/justification of the "rough proportionality" 
exaction against B.A.M. This apparent abandonment implicitly 
acknowledges the correctness of B.A.M. original assertions: 
that the COUNTY'S and the District Court's methodology in 
apply Dolan were incorrect. 
But it is now "too late" for the COUNTY to re-enter a 
different horse in the race or to "change bets" at the 
conclusion of the race. The District Court has entered its 
"findings" and "conclusions", and the COUNTY is essentially 
bound by the entered "findings" and "conclusions". The 
COUNTY cannot now for the first time on appeal claim 
that "Judge Hansen might have ruled this way, for this 
reason". The simple fact is that Judge Hansen wasn't 
presented with that issue, and he didn't rule that way. So 
to say or infer otherwise is inappropriate. 
The COUNTY'S newly identified assertion i.e. "rough 
proportionality" of the exaction imposed upon B.A.M. can be 
determined by the length of the traffic link roadway [7200 
West to 8400 West: approximately 7900 feet] contradicts 
long-established, "black letter" law that an issue first 
raised on appeal will not be considered. See Holmstrom vs C 
R England, Inc., 2000 UT App 239, 8 P.3d 281 (Utah Court of 
Appeals 2000) [before a party may advance an issue on 
appeal, the record must clearly show that it was timely 
presented to the trial court in a manner sufficient to 
obtain a ruling thereon], Salt Lake County vs Calston, 776 
P.d 653 (Utah Court of Appeals 1989) [issues presented for 
first time on appeal are deemed waived, precluding Court of 
Appeals from considering their merits on appeal], Buehner 
Block Co vs UWC Associates, 752 P. 2d 892 (Utah Supreme Court 
1988) [record must clearly show the issue was timely 
presented to trial court in manner sufficient to obtain 
ruling thereon] , and Olson vs Park-Craig-Olson, Inc, 815 
P.2d 1356 (Utah Court of Appeals 1991) [appellate court may 
weigh only those facts and legal arguments preserved in 
trial court record]. 
That the COUNTY'S newly-identified justification was 
not presented to the trial court is implicitly acknowledged 
not only by the lack of any written "finding" to that 
specific issue, but also the issue directly contradicts the 
District Court's expressed "findings" and the "conclusions", 
particularly "conclusion of law #5" which is the essential 
"core" of the District Court's resolution of the problem. In 
this context, the Court of Appeals must remember that the 
COUNTY could have presented any theory, or even multiple 
theories, to the trial court, for "finding" and/or 
"conclusion", if such were in the record. 
The newly-advanced issue was not litigated, there was 
Q 
no significant evidence presented on the issue (although 
there was brief evidence presented only as to the length of 
the roadway "link" (i.e. approximately one and one-half 
miles), but not more. There was absolutely no evidence 
adduced at trial as to the "value" of the existing 
improvement" [see Banberry Development Corporation vs South 
Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah Supreme Court 1981)] as is 
otherwise required to satisfy the "constitutional standard 
of reasonableness". 
Not only is the Record devoid of any such "value" 
evidence, the newly-derived arithmetic calculations by the 
COUNTY contain the following conceptual flaws: 
1. By focusing merely upon the real estate 
"dedication", the methodology continues to ignore 
and overlook B.A.M.'s claim for $200,000+ of out-
of-pocket expenses associated with the roadway 
improvements (curb, gutter, sidewalk, and so 
forth) it was required to install, benefitting the 
public-at-large and from which B.A.M. achieved no 
individualized benefit, except as members of the 
public-at-large. 
2 . Had the newly-identified issue been litigated, 
the truthful evidence would have been that the 
3500 South roadway for the "link" is simply not 
"wide open" (undersigned's terminology) to the 
full 106-foot right-of-way width (as the COUNTY'S 
mathematical methodology implies), but is rather 
a roadway of varying widths, at many places 
significantly more narrow (sometimes as narrow as 
a single traffic lane each direction) and adjacent 
to already developed adjacent properties. Thus, 
when the roadway is fully improved (ostensibly by 
UDOT at some futuristic time), UDOT will have to 
pay significant amounts to acquire the necessary 
"right-of-way", which the COUNTY knows is not 
presently there. That the COUNTY implicitly 
incorporates that right-of-way into its 
mathematical fraction (as the denominator) is 
erroneous. 
IV 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES FOR APPEAL 
This entire case in the District Court originally, 
"on appeal" to both appellate courts, and following the 
Supreme Court's "remand" to the District Court centers on 
the "constitutional" issues raised in the original pleading 
[RECORD, page 1] and concluding with the District Court's 
"Memorandum Decision" [RECORD of "remand proceeding" October 
2006, page 247-253] , impliedly if not facially acknowledging 
that the "rough proportionality" issue was presented to the 
District Court for adjudication. 
The Plaintiff's arguments and position vis-a-vis the 
constitutional claims asserted within this appeal are more 
than adequately identified and addressed within the 
PLAINTIFF'S TRIAL BRIEF (April 2001) [RECORD at 75-105], 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW (May 2001) [RECORD at 
150-246], and more recently the PLAINTIFF'S "TRIAL BRIEF" 
FOLLOWING REMAND FROM THE UTAH SUPREME COURT (October 2 0 06) 
[RECORD at 503-537] . 
The claims of B.A.M. are more than adequately 
identified and preserved. The COUNTY'S arguments on that 
issue are spurious and disingenuous. 
V 
THE NATURE OF THIS APPEAL TO REVIEW 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO CORRECTLY APPLY 
THE NOLLAN-DOLAN "ROUGH PROPORTIONALITY" STANDARD 
DOES NOT REQUIRE THE "MARSHALLING OF THE EVIDENCE" 
Similarly, the COUNTY'S assertions concerning the 
Appellant's claimed "failure to marshal the evidence" from 
the Record are disingenuous and erroneous. This "appeal" is 
not framed to have arisen from a narrow evidentiary ruling 
buried in the Record, or even from a claim that the evidence 
fails to support the verdict. For the most part, the 
"evidence" adduced at trial (i.e. 3.04% roadway traffic 
"impact"; uncompensated required dedication of real estate 
and installation of adjacent improvements) is undisputed.2 
B.A.M.'s claims can be adjudicated on appeal essentially 
without resort to the Record from the trial court. The 
District Court's "findings" and "conclusions" essentially 
recite the actual "evidence", essentially correctly. 
But those "findings" and "conclusions" themselves 
facially so as written by the COUNTY and as accepted by 
the District Court materially manifest the District Court's 
failure to understand and apply the "rough proportionality" 
standard. 
Such is the B.A.M. "appeal" and no "marshalling" should 
be expected or required. 
2The Appellant B.A.M. asserts that the actual 
"denominator" for the "traffic impact percentage" should not 
be the 12,000 vehicles per day starting number (thus deriving 
the 3.04%) , but rather should be the 36,000+ vehicles per day 
as the carrying capacity of the roadway fully improved to the 
53-foot "half-width", as B.A.M. was required to dedicate and 
improve across its 900-foot frontage. Indeed, the mathematical 
and conceptual accuracy of that methodology is implicitly 
acknowledged by the COUNTY'S attempt not per se allowed on 
appeal to recast and recharacterize the extent of the 
improvements and roadway right-of-way (and thus its ultimate 
"carrying capacity") for the roadway "link". 
Also note that were this case to be an "impact fees" case 
(by which the costs of the improved roadway are more equitably 
spread across-the-board to other developments, which is not 
the case here) , state statute Section 11-36-102 (14) (b) , Utah 
Code prohibits the use of "state roadways" in the numerical 
calculations to arrive at the "impact fee" to be charged by 
local government. Such being the stated legislative policy of 
the State, the COUNTY is definitely "on thin ice" for the 
uncompensated, required exaction imposed upon B.A.M. 
i o 
VI 
THE "RIPENESS", "FINALITY" AND 
"EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES" ARGUMENTS 
OF THE COUNTY ARE DISINGENUOUS AND INCORRECT 
The COUNTY'S arguments as to "(lack of) ripeness", 
"finality" and "exhaustion of administrative remedies" and 
so forth, as asserted in its Brief, are all generally and 
specifically disingenuous and incorrect. Those arguments are 
simply the rehash of earlier arguments, arising from the 
flawed misunderstanding, conveniently assumed by the COUNTY 
for self-serving purposes that this case is a "land-use 
appeal". This case isn't. 
This case is a straight-up pleaded litigation for the 
unconstitutional "takings" and "equal protection" 
violations, in an "inverse condemnation" action, brought 
under the "self-executing" provisions of the Utah 
Constitution (and the corresponding federal provisions, per 
Nollan and Dolan) . There is and was no requirement for any 
"notice of claim" to be filed in advance of the litigation, 
as a condition precedent to the litigation. See Colman vs 
State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990) . Similarly, there 
was no requirement for any "administrative hearing". See 
Section 63-90a-4, Utah Code. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court 
essentially ruled on the merits inferential, implied or 
otherwise of these issues, to the detriment of the COUNTY. 
The issues ought not be revisited. 
Finality and ripeness of the "administrative appeal", 
"administrative exhaustion of remedies", and so forth are 
disingenuously advanced, for a number of simple reasons: 
1. First and foremost, the COUNTY in 1998 
acting through the Board of County Commissioners, 
refused to even consider the BAM "administrative 
appeal". [It wasn't that the COUNTY Board of 
Commissioners "heard" the appeal and then denied 
the appeal; the Board refused to even hear it!] 
Thus, it is disingenuous for the COUNTY to now 
claim there are "exhaustion of remedies" and 
related issues precluding judicial review of the 
pleaded claims.] 
2. As far as any "ripeness" question goes, we are 
here dealing with an actual "physical taking", 
effected in 1999 pursuant to final action by the 
COUNTY in finally approving of the development. 
Even though the litigation had been filed in 1998, 
the COUNTY had that entire year to rescind its 
earlier action and has had almost eight years 
since to rescind its "taking" decision. To say now 
that the case has "ripeness" features is simply 
-i £ 
incorrect and disingenuous. 
Plaintiff's claims as to "equal protection" and 
"uniform operation of laws" have always been and are part-
and-parcel of the Plaintiff's case. Those claims have never 
been abandoned. That the Utah Supreme Court's original "writ 
of certiorari" review of the original B.A.M. Development I 
(Court of Appeals 2004) decision was narrowly confined to 
the narrow procedural or substantive questions which the 
Supreme Court framed for that certiorari review should not 
be now construed to preclude BAM from making its historic 
claims. The "equal protection" and "uniform operation" 
claims as well as the "state law" claims of "reasonable 
relationship" [Call vs West Jordan, 606 P. 2d 217 (Utah 
Supreme Court 1979), on rehearing 614 P.2d 1259 (Utah 
Supreme Court 1980)] and "the constitutional standard of 
reasonableness" (Banberry Development vs South Jordan City 
(1981)] are essentially the same constitutional basis, 
albeit framed and approached somewhat differently. 
Had the COUNTY recognized and followed Dolan from the 
beginning administratively and/or even judicially in the 
first District Court proceeding (in which the COUNTY 
advanced spurious arguments and justifications which were 
unanimously swept aside by all eight appellate judges) we 
probably wouldn't now be arguing about how broadly or 
"1 £ 
narrowly the Utah Supreme Court should have decided things 
on "certiorari" and/or what was preserved within that 
"appeal". 
Similarly, the COUNTY likewise forgets that its 
administrative staff similarly rejected BAM's offer to not 
effect the roadway improvements, unless and until UDOT 
actually required those improvements and was willing to pay 
for those improvements (at government expense) and would 
through eminent domain acquire the necessary right-of-way 
(from the existing pavement) to the so-called 53-foot line. 
See Testimony of Scott McCleary, RECORD/TRANSCRIPT at pages 
35, lines 1 through 18, and Page 42, lines 5-13, in "remand 
hearing" (October 2006) . 
Furthermore, any "lack of administrative appeal" 
arguments (from the COUNTY) must be disregarded for the 
simple reason that the "highway-abutting" Ordinance 
essentially mandated the unconstitutional exaction 
(installation of improvements, regardless of the right-of-
way "width" dedication) and the COUNTY could not ignore or 
disregard the mandatory provisions of its own ordinance. 
So for the COUNTY to now "split hairs" on issues of 
"ripeness", "finality" and/or "exhaustion of administrative 
remedies" is simply disingenuous and should not be accepted. 
As far as B.A.M.'s claimed (by COUNTY) "failure to 
object" trial court's "findings" and so forth, the Plaintiff 
wasn't given an opportunity to "object" or even comment to 
the District Court's findings and conclusions. The District 
Court issued its written Memorandum Decision on 27 December; 
copies thereof were mailed to counsel. Assuming, for sake of 
argument, that COUNTY'S counsel prepared the findings 
facially indicating that Lohra Miller was then the District 
Attorney (which didn't occur until January 2nd), and that a 
copy thereof was thereafter served upon Plaintiff's counsel 
(the document itself doesn't even indicate such was actually 
done) Plaintiff's counsel would have, theoretically "ten 
days" in which to respond and comment, and perhaps even 
object. And because the ten days is "less than eleven days", 
intervening weekend days are not included, thus extending 
until January 14th (or even later if service by mail was 
utilized). But Judge Hansen signed the "findings" on January 
11th, a mere 9 days after the earliest possible date those 
"findings" could have been filed with the Court and served 
upon counsel. 
Given Judge Tim Hanson's seeming urgency and propensity 
to "get rid of this case" judicially following his 
retirement from the bench any additional effort seeking 
Judge Hanson's "review" or reconsideration of the "findings" 
would be an exercise in futility. 
i o 
As noted above, B.A.M. does not really take issue with 
the entered "findings", which essentially and accurately 
reflect what actually happened and, for the most part, the 
evidence adduced at trial: not necessarily all the evidence, 
but at least the evidence necessary for the District Court's 
determination nevertheless believed to be wrong of "no 
cause of action". That the COUNTY chose an illogical method 
to arrive at that "conclusion" [#5] evidences exactly why 
and how this appeal is meritorious. 
VII 
"EQUAL PROTECTION" AND "UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS" 
CLAIMS OF B.A.M. AGAINST THE "HIGHWAY-ABUTTING" ORDINANCE 
AND THE REQUIRED EXACTIONS THEREUNDER 
ARE MERITORIOUS AND LIKEWISE INVALIDATE THE 
COUNTY-REQUIRED EXACTION (OF DEDICATION AND IMPROVEMENT) 
As noted earlier, the unconstitutionality facially 
and as applied in this case of the so-called "highway-
abutting" Ordinance (whereunder only those parcels abutting 
the roadway are exacted against, while nearby parcels 
creating the same "impact" described in terms of vehicles on 
the roadway are not required to dedicate or improve 
anything) is readily apparent. The Ordinance and its 
exactions cannot be justified or defended, even if it is 
uniformly applied against all "highway-abutting" parcels, 
while simultaneously leaving untouched "similarly-situated" 
(the COUNTY'S frequently cited terminology, albeit for the 
1 Q 
incorrect analytical point) parcels having the same 
corresponding "impact" (defined in vehicles, not adjacency 
to the roadway). 
In Malan vs Lewis, 693 P. 2d 661 (Utah Supreme Court 
1984), the Utah Supreme Court invalidating the Utah 
"automobile guest statute" illuminated and articulated the 
purposes and application of the "uniform operation of laws" 
and the "equal protection" provisions of the constitutions. 
In Malan the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
For a law to be constitutional under Article I, 
section 24, it is not enough that it be uniform on 
its face. What is critical is that the operation 
of the law be uniform. A law does not operate 
uniformly if "persons similarly situated are not 
"treated similarly" or if "persons in different 
circumstances" are "treated as if their 
circumstances were the same." 
693 P.2d 661 at 669. Emphasis added. 
The dedication and the improvement required from the 
Plaintiff when the similarly-situated, "side-by-side" 
developer of "Elusive Meadows" immediately to the south pays 
nothing is not the "uniform operation" the constitution 
requires. The "abutting-highway" criterion for the 
"classification" is a blatant, straight-forward attempt to 
avoid the constitution requirement of paying for the 
"taking". 
In State Tax Commission vs Department of Finance, 576 
P. 2d 1297 (Utah Supreme Court 1978), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
Equal protection protects against 
discrimination within a class. The legislature has 
considerable discretion in the designation of 
classifications but the court must determine 
whether such classifications operate equally on 
all persons similarly situated. 
Thus, whether a classification operates 
uniformly on all persons situated within 
constitutional parameters is an issue that must 
ultimately be decided by the judiciary. 
576 P.2d at 1298. Emphasis added. 
The Defendant COUNTY would have the Court believe there 
is no "equal protection" and/or "uniform operation" 
violation because the "highway-abutting" approach treats all 
"similarly-situated" propertyowners the same: all "highway-
abutting" property owners must effect the required 
dedications and make the required improvements and all other 
(i.e. non-"highway-abutting") propertyowners don't have to 
do anything! It is that simple! The constitutions require 
that similarly-situated persons (in this case, 
propertyowners at large) be treated "equally" and 
"uniformly". Everyone ought to be required to contribute an 
equitable share to the costs of the roadways which everyone 
is entitled to use. A single group, regardless of how 
creatively or carefully defined (i.e. "highway-abutting"), 
of propertyowners cannot be unconstitutionally coerced to 
provide 100% of the costs of the roadway improvements, 
merely by reason of the "coincidence of geography". 
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In the instant case, there are but two classification 
groups: those "highway-abutting" parcels forced to bear 100% 
and those parcels which do not abut a highway (and are thus 
entitled to pay nothing, even though they may create the 
exact same impact. The residents of the Elusive Meadows 
subdivision immediately to the south of Westridge Meadows do 
not merely hop in their car, drive down Montclair Drive 
almost to 3500 South, and then turn around and return to 
their homes, without exiting the subdivisions onto 3500 
South. Those "Elusive Meadows" residents do utilize 3500 
South, for which they have paid nothing. The situation 
should not be, for example, wherein Elusive Meadows people 
pay nothing and the Westridge Meadows pays everything. 
CONCLUSION 
The COUNTY'S "highway-abutting" Ordinance and the 
"exactions" required thereunder (not merely a real estate 
dedication but also the installation of adjacent 
improvements) is a blatant attempt to evade the 
constitutional requirement of "paying for the change". Those 
excessive, unconstitutional burdens cannot be imposed upon 
B.A.M. merely because of the geographic misfortune of being 
adjacent to a roadway the COUNTY desires to have widened and 
improved. The "exaction" (dedication and improvements) 
benefit the public-at-large and are of no specific benefit 
to B.A.M.'s residents, except as members of the public-at-
large (because of the impassable barrier fencing). 
Similarly, the exaction is excessive because other 
improvements were required for the "frontage" of those lots 
on the "internal street" of the development. 
The District Court failed to correctly apply the 
Nollan-Dolan "rough proportionality" standard: the COUNTY'S 
seeming abandonment of its original mathematical and legal 
justification (ala Conclusion #5) , as reflected in the 
COUNTY-prepared "findings" and "conclusions", and the 
COUNTY'S newly-identified request to adopt an alternative 
methodology not presented to the District Court confirm the 
B.A.M. position that the COUNTY (and the District Court) 
simply have done it wrong. The District Court's "conclusion 
#5" is clearly erroneous as a "matter of law" as to the 
application of the "rough proportionality" standard. 
The District Court decision must be reversed and the 
case remanded to the District Court for entry of judgment in 
favor of B.A.M. for the entirety of its claims: the value of 
the real estate dedication as well as the direct expenses 
for the required improvements to the 3500 South roadway. 
Respectfully submitted this 31st day of August, 2007. 
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